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ABSTRACT 
This paper is concerned with the effect of section 14 of the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 on the law of copyright in New Zealand. Section 14 affirms 
freedom of expression. The first part considers the concept of freedom of expression 
and its statutory basis in New Zealand. The second part locates the conflict between 
copyright and freedom of expression, and considers the role of two copyright 
principles which may themselves protect the right to freedom of expression, the idea-
expression dichotomy and the defence of fair dealing. The third part considers the 
possibility of a separate defence to copyright which promotes the interests of freedom 
of expression. 
The text of this paper ( excluding contents page, footnotes and bibliography) 
comprises approximately 14,100 words. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Section 14 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 states that: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, 
receive, and impart information and opinions of any kind in any form. 
6 
This paper is concerned with the effect of section 14 on the law of copyright in New 
Zealand. 
In New Zealand to date, there is only one case which has considered freedom of 
expression in the context of copyright: Television New Zealand Ltd v Newsmonitor 
Services Ltd. 1 This case touches on themes which feature in the international 
jurisprudence on copyright and freedom of expression. This paper will use 
Newsmonitor as a basis for considering this jurisprudence, and applying it to the New 
Zealand situation. 
Newsmonitor raised the issue of political expression in the context of news reporting. 
The defendant, Newsmonitor Services, ran a business which involved supplying 
transcripts of TVNZ news and current affairs programmes to contracted customers. 
Newsmonitor's customers advised in advance what their areas of interest were. 
Newsmonitor would videotape TVNZ broadcasts, and use these to make transcripts 
which it would then supply to its customers for a fee. 
TVNZ sued for copyright infringement. Counsel for Newsmonitor argued that the 
Copyright Act should be interpreted so as to promote the right to freedom of 
expression guaranteed by section 14 of the Bill of Rights Act. It was argued that the 
Copyright Act restricted Newsmonitor's right to "receive and impart information and 
opinions of any kind in any form", by granting a statutory monopoly to the copyright 
owner. For this reason counsel for Newsmonitor argued that TVNZ news 
programmes should be available for use by Newsmonitor.2 
Blanchard J rejected the defendant's argument on the basis that there is no conflict 
between copyright and freedom of expression. He argued that copyright protects 
only the expression of ideas, not ideas themselves, and that freedom of expression 
protects only the right to disseminate ideas, not the right to copy expression.3 
3 
[1994] 2 NZLR 91. 
Above n 1, 95 . 
Above n 1, 95. 
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In relation to the defendant's argument that it was providing a useful service in 
increasing the free flow of information, Blanchard J stated that the defendant was not 
entitled to "free-ride" on TVNZ by using TVNZ's programmes for its own profit. 
He stated that to allow this would undermine the rationales behind the copyright 
. 4 
regime. 
7 
Blanchard J's judgment illustrates several themes that run through the international 
case law on copyright and freedom of expression. In examining these themes, this 
paper falls into three main parts. The first part5 considers the concept of freedom of 
expression and its statutory basis in New Zealand. The second part6 locates the 
conflict between copyright and freedom of expression and considers the role of two 
copyright principles which may themselves protect the right to freedom of expression: 
the idea-expression dichotomy and the defence of fair dealing. The third part of this 
paper7 looks beyond Newsmonitor to consider the possibility of a separate defence to 
copyright which promotes the interests of freedom of expression via the Bill of Rights 
Act. 
II FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
A What is "Expression"? 
"Expression" is a wide term that covers many forms of communication. A useful way 
to analyse types of expression is to divide them according to their purpose. 
One purpose of expression is to disseminate ideas, opinions and information. Another 
purpose is to express oneself artistically. Another purpose may be to advertise a good 
or service that is for sale. Many forms of expression will fulfil two or more of these 
purposes. For example, a newspaper article may have the purpose of disseminating 
information, but also have a commercial purpose in that the newspaper will make a 
profit. 
B Rationales for Freedom of Expression 
It is possible to identify three main rationales for the promotion of freedom of 
expression in New Zealand: realisation of the democratic ideal, the "marketplace of 
4 Above n 1, 107-108. 
5 Sections II to V. 
<, 
Sections VI to IX. 
7 Sections X to XI . 
ideas" as a means to truth and the value of individual autonomy. 8 This section will 
consider each of these in turn. 
1 Realisation of the democratic ideal 
In New Zealand, the guarantee of freedom of expression is contained in the part of 
the Bill of Rights Act 1990 ("the Bill of Rights") entitled "Democratic and Civil 
Rights". This suggests an important rationale for the protection of freedom of 
expression: the open discussion of public affairs in a democratic society. If voters are 
to be educated and to make a useful contribution, they must be exposed to as much 
discussion, information and opinion as possible. 
The focus of this paper is expression which promotes the open discussion of public 
affairs. This ideal will be promoted by expression which aims to disseminate 
information and opinions to the public. 
2 The "market-place of ideas" as a means to truth 
This is the idea, from US jurisprudence,9 that the importance of expression is as a 
means to truth. Ideas are put forward into the "market-place" to battle with other 
ideas, and through this means, the truth will be found. 
8 
However, the problem with this rationale is that it values the process over the substance 
of the right to freedom of expression. 10 An unregulated marketplace is one that does 
not restrict any expression, meaning even incorrect or hateful expression must be 
protected. On this view, the remedy for harmful expression is simply more 
expression. For this reason, the model of the unregulated marketplace of ideas will 
not necessarily be appropriate for New Zealand. 
') 
10 
These rationales are identified in: MB Ninuner Nimmer on Copyn'ght (Matthew Bender 
Publishers, 1996) 1.72-1.74; G-A Beaudoin and E Ratushny (eds) The Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms (2 ed, Carswell, Ottowa, 1989) 198-200; PW Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada 
(3 ed, Carswell, Toronto, 1992) 961-963. 
See eg Red Lion Broadcasting Co v FCC 395 US 367,390 (1969). 
L Weinrib "Does Money Talk? Commercial Expression in the Canadian Constitutional 
Context" in D Schneidenmm Freedom of Expression and the Charter (Thomson Professional 
Publishing, Canada, 1991) 337,341; E Barendt "Free Speech in Australia: A Comparative 
Perspective" (1994] 16 Sydney Law Review 149, 151. 
9 
3 Value of individual autonomy 
This rationale focuses on the individual rather than the democratic system. It 
recognises that each individual has a right to personal fulfilment, and that this can best 
be achieved by allowing each individual the measure of autonomy necessary to 
develop her own intellect, tastes and personality. 11 
Because an individual's exercise of her right to freedom of expression always impinges 
on other members of society, this rationale will be the least important for the purposes 
of this paper. It is always possible for a defendant to argue that her personal 
autonomy is being restricted. The difficult issue is how far this autonomy can 
justifiably be restricted in the wider public interest. 
III INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
The Bill of Rights was enacted in 1990 against an international background of 
increasing awareness of the need to protect fundamental human rights. Therefore, as 
there is much guidance to be gained from overseas authority, it is important to 
consider section 14 in its international context. 
A The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
The ICCPR was signed by New Zealand in 1968 and ratified in 1978. 12 The long 
title to the Bill of Rights states that the Act is to affirm New Zealand's commitment 
to the ICCPR. 
Article 19(2) of the ICCPR guarantees a right to freedom of expression which, like 
section 14 of the Bill of Rights, includes the right to "seek, receive and impart" 
information. 
B The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
In 1982, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms ("the Canadian Charter") was 
enacted as an entrenched constitutional document. The New Zealand Bill of Rights 
draws heavily on the Canadian Charter, 13 making Canadian decisions useful authority. 
II 
12 
13 
G-A Beaudoin, above n 8, 198. 
Human Rights Commission Act 1977. 
In particular, the Canadian Charter contains a limitations clause (section 1) which is very similar 
to section 5 of the New Zealand Bill ofRights. 
10 
Section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter guarantees to everyone: 
... freedom of thought, belief, opinion and other expression, including freedom of the 
press and other media of communication. 
C The United States Constitution 
The United States Constitution is a founding constitutional document. It imposes 
restrictions on the powers of Congress, so overrides any inconsistent legislation. 
The First Amendment to the US Constitution states that: 
Congress shall make no law .. . abridging the freedom of speech .. . or of the press. 
There are three important points to note about the First Amendment. First, it uses 
the word "speech" rather than "expression" as in section 14 and the Canadian 
Charter. "Expression" appears to be wider than "speech" and to encompass non-
verbal expression. However, the US courts have interpreted "speech" widely so that 
it includes non-verbal forms of expression. 14 The upshot of this is that there is no 
relevant difference between "speech" and "expression" for our purposes, and these 
terms will be used interchangeably throughout this paper. 
Secondly, the First Amendment (and the Canadian Charter) expressly mention 
freedom of the media, while section 14 does not. As a result, some New Zealand 
cases have emphasised that freedom of the press in New Zealand is no more 
important than the freedom of anyone else to speak. 15 
However, the lack of express reference to the media in section 14 has not prevented 
New Zealand courts from recognising that the media is a special case in the sense that 
it is in an ideal position to impart information to the public. 16 New Zealand courts 
14 
15 
16 
Texas v Johnson 491 US 397 (1989) held that the burning of a flag constitutes "expression"; 
United States v O'Bn'en 391 US 367 (1968) held that the burning of a draft card constitutes 
expression. 
Solidtor General v Radio New Zealand Ltd (1994] 1 NZLR 48, 61. 
Police v O'Connor (1992] 1 NZLR 87, 97. 
have also acknowledged that this special position of the media implies a correlative 
responsibility to report news events fairly and accurately. 17 
11 
Thirdly, unlike section 14 and the ICCPR, the First Amendment (and the Canadian 
Charter) do not make express reference to the right to "seek, receive and impart" 
information. However, the United States courts have held that the right to 
expression or speech encompasses the public's right to hear, 
18 which arguably achieves 
the same effect. 
D The Protection of Freedom of Expression in England 
England has no formal system for the protection of civil rights, including freedom of 
expression. However, the common law provides protection to some degree. One 
view of this protection is that it is residual only.
19 On this view, the right to freedom 
of expression is available in the "gaps" left by other laws which restrict expression, 
such as defamation, copyright and breach of confidence. 
Recently, some judges and writers have tended toward the view that common law 
protection of freedom of expression should be a positive principle.2<
1 This 
development has been heavily influenced by the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which was ratified by 
England in 1953. Article 10(1) of this Convention guarantees the right to freedom of 
expression, including the right to "receive and impart" information. 
Some writers and judges have argued that the ratification of the European 
Convention means that the rights contained within it may be regarded as principles 
which are already inherent in English law, or which may be incorporated into English 
law by judges.21 This view has been confirmed by the House of Lords in relation to 
17 
18 
l'J 
20 
21 
Police v O'Connor above n 16, 99; TV3 Network v Eveready New Zealand (1993] 3 
NZLR 435, 441 . 
Kleindienst v Mandel 408 US 753, 762-763 (1972); Red Lion Broadcasting Co v FCC above n 9, 
390. 
A Boyle "Freedom of Expression as a Public Interest in English Law" (1982] Public Law 574. 
See eg Browne-Wilkinson LJ in Wheeler v Leicester City Council (1985] AC 1054; J Laws 
"Is the High Court the Guardian of Fundamental Constitutional Rights?" [1993] Public Law 
59. 
Laws, above n 20, 61. 
12 
the right to freedom of expression.
22 However, it is yet to be applied in the context 
of copyright. 
E The Protection of Freedom of Expression in Australia 
Like England, Australia has no formal system of protection for freedom of expression. 
Therefore the same common law protections are available, to the extent that the 
English common law is applicable in Australia . 
In addition, some recent cases in the High Court of Australia
23 have indicated that 
freedom of expression may have a special status. For example, in Nationwide News v 
Will/4 the defendant newspaper published an article which criticised the integrity of 
the Arbitration Commission, a government body. The defendant was charged with 
an offence under the Industrial Relations Act 1988 of writing something "calculated 
... to bring a member of the [Arbitration Commission] ... into disrepute". The High 
Court invalidated this offence provision on the ground that it violated an implied 
constitutional right to "discuss governments and governmental institutions and 
political matters" which was essential if the Australian people were "to form the 
political judgements required for the exercise of their constitutional functions . "
25 
IV PROTECTION OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN NEW 
ZEALAND 
A Status of New Zealand Bill of Rights 
As already mentioned, the statutory basis of freedom of expression in New Zealand is 
section 14 of the Bill of Rights. What makes the New Zealand Bill of Rights unusual 
in comparison to the formal systems of rights in other countries is its constitutional 
status. Canada and the United States each have systems of rights that are 
"entrenched", which means that the rights cannot be overridden by the legislature. 
The Supreme Courts of Canada and the United States have the power to declare 
invalid any legislation which they find to be in breach of the constitution. 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Derbyshire County Coundl v Times Newspapers Ltd [1993] 1 All ER 1011 . 
Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1; Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v 
The Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106. 
Above 11 23. 
Above 11 23, 48. 
13 
By contrast, the New Zealand Bill of Rights is an ordinary statute and, as such, does 
not override any other statute. This is made clear by section 4,2(' which provides that 
if a statutory provision is inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights, then 
the statute must prevail. 
B Interpretation of the Bill of Rights 
1 Purposive interpretation 
The Court of Appeal has stated that the Bill of Rights should be approached in a 
manner that is consistent with its subject matter. 27 Therefore interpretation of the Bill 
of Rights should be broad rather than technical. The Court has also stated that a 
purposive approach to interpretation is called for. 28 This means that in deciding the 
content of a right that is contained in the Bill of Rights, reference should be made to 
the purpose of the right. So in considering the meaning of freedom of expression, the 
interests that freedom of expression aims to protect are important. 
2 Machinery provisions of Bill of Rights 
Part I of the Bill of Rights contains machinery provisions which state how rights, such 
as the right to freedom of expression, are to be interpreted and applied. The first of 
these is section 3, which states that the Bill of Rights applies only to acts done: 
(a) By the legislative, executive or judicial branches of the government of New 
Zealand; or 
(b) By any person or body in the performance of any public function, power or 
duty conferred or imposed on that person or body by or pursuant to law. 
Therefore the Bill of Rights applies to the Copyright Act 1994, since that Act is an 
act by the legislative branch of the government. 
2(, 
27 
28 
Section 4 of the Bill of Rights provides that: 
No court shall, in relation to any enactment (whether passed or made before or after the 
commencement of this Bill of Rights) 
(a) Hold any provision of the enactment to be impliedly repealed or revoked, 
or to be in any way invalid or ineffective; or 
(b) Decline to apply any provision of the enacbnent by reason only that the 
provision is inconsistent with any provision of this Bill of Rights. 
Noori v Ministry of Transport; Curran v Police (1990-92] 1 NZBORR 132, 143. 
Above n 27, 139, 153, 171. 
14 
Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Bill of Rights are the other important machinery 
provisions. Section 4 has been mentioned already.
29 Section 5 provides that: 
Subject to section 4 of this Bill of Rights, the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill 
of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
Section 6 provides that: 
Wherever an enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent with the rights and 
freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be preferred to any other 
meaning. 
The issue is how these provisions influence the effect of section 14 of the Bill of 
Rights on the law of copyright in New Zealand.3'
1 
V APPLICATION OF BILL OF RIGHTS ACT TO COPYRIGHT LAW 
A Aid to Interpreting an Ambiguous Statutory Provision 
Section 6 of the Bill of Rights allows the court to consider whether a provision can 
be given a meaning consistent with the Bill of Rights. If it can, then this meaning is 
to be preferred to any other meaning. In Ncwsmonitor, for example, the argument3
1 
was that sections 15 and 19 of the Copyright Act 1962
32 should be interpreted in 
accordance with section 14 of the Bill of Rights. However, if the provision is clearly 
inconsistent with the Bill of Rights, then section 4 of the Bill of Rights means that 
section 14 cannot apply at all. 
The most difficult point is the role of section 5 in interpreting statutes. The difficulty 
is that section 4 means that a right can be overridden, whether or not this is 
2'J 
30 
31 
32 
See text at n 26. 
There is much judicial and academic debate over the correct interpretation and effect of sections 
4, 5 and 6 of the Bill ofRights. See eg P Rishworth "The New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990: The First Fifteen Months" in DM Paciocco (ed) Essays vn the New Zealand Bill 
vf Rights Act 1990 (Legal Research Foundation, Auckland, 1992). This controversy is beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
No express reference was made to sections 4, 5 or 6 in the report of the case. 
The Copyright Act 1962 preceded the Copyright Act 1994. Section 15 dealt with infringement 
of copyright in television broadcasts, and section 19 with the defence of fair dealing. 
15 
reasonable or demonstrably justified, simply by enacting a statute overriding the right. 
This consideration has led Cooke P to state that section 5 has no part to play in 
. . 31 
mterpretmg statutes ."· 
However, Richardson J does see a role for section 5 in the context of interpreting 
statutes .34 His approach is to take the right, consider it against the statutory provision, 
then to limit the right in accordance with section 5. At this point, the limited right is 
compared with the statutory provision. There are two possibilities . If an 
interpretation of the provision consistent with the limited right is reasonably open, 
section 6 should be applied and the consistent interpretation preferred. Alternatively, 
if a consistent interpretation is not reasonably open, section 4 applies and the right 
does not apply at aU.3
5 
B A Principle to Consider in Applying a Statutory Test 
The type of interpretation problem envisaged by the preceding section is one where a 
statutory provision is ambiguous and the provision can reasonably be interpreted in 
accordance with the Bill of Rights. Another type of problem which arises in 
interpreting a statute is where the statutory words are not ambiguous, but vague.
3
(' In 
this situation, a right contained in the Bill of Rights may be taken into account in 
deciding the issue at hand.
37 
This was the real problem in Ncwsmonitor. The particular defence relied on was "fair 
dealing" for the purposes of "research or private study". Although left undeveloped 
by defendant's counsel, the argument was not that the terms "fair" or "private study" 
were ambiguous and should therefore be given a meaning consistent with section 14. 
The argument was really that in applying the test for fair dealing, the court should 
have regard to the interests protected by section 14.
38 
JJ 
34 
35 
37 
JH 
Above n 27, 144. 
Above n 27, 158-160. 
It is not necessary for the purposes of this paper to reach any conclusion on the role of section 5 
and 6 in interpreting statutes. 
The distinction between an ambiguous provision and a vague provision is noted by Rishworth 
aboven30, 16-17. 
See Rishworth, above n 30, 23. 
This approach to interpreting the fair dealing provisions is discussed further below at section 
VIII D and E. 
16 
This approach involves an application of section 6, albeit a less direct one than 
deciding between two competing meanings of an ambiguous statutory provision. 
Furthermore, there appears to be scope for the use of section 5 under this approach. 
The interests protected by a right contained in the Bill of Rights could be considered 
to the extent necessary to avoid limiting the right unreasonably, or in a way that is 
not demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
Arguably therefore, it is possible for section 14 to apply to the Copyright Act. The 
next issue is whether there is in fact a conflict between copyright and section 14. If 
the Copyright Act is consistent with section 14, the Bill of Rights can have no further 
application to the case. To consider this, it is necessary first to analyse the law of 
copyright. 
VI COPYRIGHT 
A Historical Origins of Copyright 
In England, control of printing was for many years exercised by the Crown.39 
Control was achieved by licensing schemes which meant that only a small group of 
people were entitled to print material. This monopoly over printing was initially for 
reasons of censorship. It enabled the Crown to control the printing and dissemination 
of seditious or blasphemous material. Therefore the historical basis of copyright, in 
England at least, 40 was a set of interests directly opposed to those protected by 
freedom of expression. 
The first copyright statute, the Statute of Anne, was passed in 1709. It granted to 
authors an exclusive right to print their books, and the right to prevent others from 
doing so. Successive English statutes developed the author's right to copyright 
protection. The most recent is the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, on 
which the 1994 New Zealand Act is heavily based. 
J9 
40 
The sun1111ary of the origins of copyright in this section is taken from Laddie, Prescott and 
Vitoria The Modern I.Aw o_f Copyright and Designs (2 ed, Butterworths, London, 1995) 18-22 and 
A Brown and A Grant The I.Aw o_(Intellectual Property in New Zealand (Butterworths, Wellington, 
1989) 224-229. 
Patry argues that in the United States, the origin of copyright was not in censorship but in the 
private property rights model: WF Patry The Fair Use Pn'vilege in Copyright I.Aw (Bureau of 
National Affairs, Washington, 1985) 462-465 . 
17 
B Rationales for Modern Copyright Protection 
1 Encourage creativity 
The main rationale for copyright is to encourage and reward authors who create 
original works .4 1 If authors did not have their works protected by copyright, they 
would be discouraged from releasing them to the public since others could 
appropriate the author's work and use it for economic gain, to the detriment of the 
author. Granting a monopoly to the author ensures that the author has an economic 
incentive to create and disseminate original works. It is this public interest in the 
creation and dissemination of original works that is the main rationale for copyright 
protection. 
This rationale is reflected in the United States Constitution. Article I, section 8 grants 
to Congress the power to "promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by 
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their 
respective writings and discoveries". This acknowledges the connection between the 
granting of a copyright monopoly to the author and the promotion of "science and 
the useful arts" . 42 
This rationale is further reflected in various devices of copyright which limit the 
exclusive right of the copyright holder to ensure that information is available to the 
public. Most significantly, the author is not protected unless the work is original and 
involves more than mere ideas.43 This ensures that the author does not have a 
monopoly over things which should be in the public domain. For instance, a work 
does not infringe if it takes a part of the author's work which is not original but 
merely factual, because the author is not allowed control over facts. 
Another device which limits the exclusive right of the copyright holder is the defence 
of fair dealing. 44 This defence allows members of the public to make certain uses of 
the author's work, such as use in news reporting and research, without the author's 
consent. 
41 
42 
43 
44 
Laddie Prescott and Vitoria, above n 39, 4. 
See Patry, above n 40. 
Laddie et al , above n 39, 46-60, 71-74. 
The defence of fair dealing is discussed further below at section VIII. 
18 
2 Author's control 
The subsidiary rationale for copyright is based on the privacy interest of authors. 45 
This rationale reflects the view that the author should be able to control the 
dissemination of her work and even prevent it from being disseminated at all if she so 
chooses. It is related to freedom of expression in that the author has the freedom to 
express her work or to choose not to. 46 
Therefore, an argument can be made that copyright law itself protects freedom of 
expression. If this is correct, perhaps there is no conflict between section 14 and the 
law of copyright. 
Blanchard J in Newsmonitor, and many writers and judges in the United States, argue 
that this is the case.47 Others argue that there is a conflict, but that it can be 
resolved. 48 Those who argue that there is no conflict do so on the basis of one or two 
principles of copyright law: the idea-expression dichotomy and the defence of fair 
dealing. These principles will be considered in tum. 
VII THE ROLE OF THE IDEA-EXPRESSION DICHOTOMY 
A Blanchard]'s View in Newsmonitor 
Blanchard J's conclusion that there was no conflict between the Copyright Act 1962 
and section 14 of the Bill of Rights was based on the Copyright Act being interpreted 
in accordance with the idea-expression dichotomy. 
The defendant's argument in Newsmonitor was that: 49 
45 
4/, 
47 
4R 
4') 
bddie et al, above n 39, 4. 
Harper & Rvw Publishers Inc v Nativn Enterprises 85 L Ed 2d 588, 606 (1985). 
US writers who argue there is no conflict are WF Patry, above n 40; P Goldstein Cvpyright 
(Little Brown & Company, USA, 1989) 238-243, and see below at section VIII . Cases which 
have dismissed the possibility of a conflict are Sid & Marty Krv_fft Tclevisivn Prvductivns Inc v 
McDvnalds Cvrp 562 F 2d 1157 (1977); Wainwright Sec Inc v Wall St Transcnpt Cvrp 558 F 2d 91 
(1977); Walt Disney Prvductivns v Air Pirates 581 F 2d 751 (1978); TVNZ v Newsmvnitvr, above 
11 1. 
Most notably Ninuner, above n 8. In Triangle Publicativns v Knight-Ridder Newspapers Inc 626 F 
2d 1171, 1180-1181 (1980), Judge Brown adopted Ninuuer's reasoning. 
Above n 1, 95. 
... the Copyright Act inhibits the free flow of information within the community by 
granting the originator of various works or products a statutory monopoly whereby 
that person may prevent others from doing certain acts in relation to them. 
19 
In responding to this argument, Blanchard J agreed that: 50 
... TV news and current affairs programmes disseminate information and opinions, ... 
the defendant is engaged in receiving and imparting that material and ... the plaintiff 
seeks to prevent the defendant from doing so .... 
However, he went on to reject the defendant's argument on the basis of the idea-
. d" h SI expression 1c otomy:· 
... [ copyright] is not granted in respect of information itself It does not prevent the 
taking and reuse of knowledge itself Copyright protects not ideas but the form in 
which they are expressed. Ideas can be appropriated so long as they are not expressed 
simply by copying the words of the author. 
Provided the Copyright Act is interpreted in a manner consistent with this 
fundamental rule of copyright law there can be no conflict with section 14 [ of the Bill 
of Rights], for what is protected there is the right to express and receive ideas and 
opinions. Section 14 does not provide a guarantee of a right to appropriate someone 
else's form of expression. "Freedom of expression" does not mean freedom to copy 
the form in which authors have expressed themselves.... Yet at the same time, nothing 
in the Copyright Act, on my interpretation of it, prevents the defendants in this case 
from summarising the content of the programmes and disseminating their summaries 
to their customers. The plaintiffs argument relates to the use which may be made of 
the very words which were broadcast. 
Significantly, Blanchard J does not consider in any detail the right to freedom of 
expression as contained in section 14, nor does he look to the origin or rationales of 
freedom of expression. Instead, he simply quotes the words of section 14 to support 
his view that what section 14 protects is "the right to express and receive ideas and 
opinions" . From this he concludes, without analysis, that section 14 does not provide 
a guarantee of a "right to appropriate someone else's form of expression". 
In Bill of Rights terms, Blanchard J's view appears to be that since there is no conflict 
between section 14 and copyright protection, the Bill of Rights has no application to 
the infringement provisions of the Copyright Act. On this view, the Copyright Act is 
50 
51 
Above 11 1, 95. 
Above 11 1, 95. 
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plainly consistent with the right contained in section 14. Therefore there is no need 
to resort to section 4, 5 or 6 of the Bill of Rights to resolve the issue. Certainly 
Blanchard J had no desire to undermine the rights and freedoms contained in the Bill 
of Rights, stating that "it would be undesirable for a Court to make a decision 
inconsistent with those rights and freedoms. "
52 
B Limitations of Idea-Expression Dichotomy as a Protection for Freedom of 
Expression 
1 Introduction 
Blanchard J's conclusion that there is no conflict between copyright and freedom of 
expression depends on the validity of the idea-expression dichotomy. His view 
involves an assumption, first, that copyright protection is always limited to "form of 
expression", and secondly, that freedom of expression is always limited only to 
"ideas". If it can be shown that copyright protection extends beyond the mere form 
of expression of ideas, or alternatively, that freedom of expression encompasses the 
form of expression of ideas as well as the ideas themselves, then one cannot depend 
on the idea-expression dichotomy to avoid the conflict between copyright and 
freedom of expression. To consider this, it is necessary to examine each of these 
assumptions in turn. 
2 The idea-expression dichotomy in copyright 
The first thing to note about Blanchard J's interpretation of the idea-expression 
dichotomy is that he appears to reduce the dichotomy to form and content. He states 
that copyright does not protect "information itself', but that it does protect "the form 
in which [ideas] are expressed".
53 On this view, the "form" of a literary work is no 
more than the actual words used. 
The distinction between form and content is a valid one. However, "expression" 
defined as mere forn1 does not represent the scope of what copyright law actually 
protects. If it did, a person could avoid infringing copyright by simply changing a few 
of the actual words used, or by translating the content into another language.
54 
Therefore, the distinction between form and content is not valid as an indication of 
the scope of copyright protection. 
52 
54 
Above n 1, 95. 
Above n 1, 95. 
Laddie et al, above n 39, 61. 
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Yet, if the distinction between form and content is rejected as a definition of the idea-
expression dichotomy, then the difficulty is to find another valid means to draw the 
line between what is protected by copyright and what is not protected. Learned 
Hand, an influential United States judge, has proposed a test for separating idea from 
expression by reference to a stage play:
55 
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of increasing 
generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last 
may perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what the play is about, 
and at times may consist of only its title; but there is a point in this series of 
abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could 
prevent the use of his 'ideas', to which, apart from their expression, his property is 
never extended. 
Laddie et al point out that this test does not indicate that ideas and expression are 
different in kind. 56 Rather, it seems to show that ideas are simply more abstract or 
widely defined than expressions. If there is no difference in kind between the two, 
then the idea-expression "dichotomy" of itself is no help in drawing the line between 
material that is protected by copyright and material that is not protected. This was 
recognised by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Bleiman v News Media (Auckland) 
Ltd:57 
In copyright law the conventional distinction between ideas and the expression of 
those ideas is helpful only up to a point .... It is all a matter of to what degree of 
particularity or generality the idea is taken .. . .It is perhaps more helpful to consider 
whether the effort, skill and judgment of the copyright owner in the making of his 
original work has been taken in the making of what appears, on a realistic assessment, 
to be a reproduction of a substantial part. 
In conclusion, the distinction between form and content fails to define the scope of 
copyright protection since copyright protection clearly extends beyond mere form. 
3 Freedom of expression and the dissemination of ideas 
We have considered the first assumption on which BlanchardJ's view is based: that 
copyright protects only "expression". It is necessary to examine the other assumption 
56 
57 
Nichols v Universal Pictures Co 45 F 2d 119, 121 (1930) . 
Liddie et al, above n 39, 62. 
[1994] 2 NZLR 673, 677-678. 
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on which Blanchard J's view depends, that "'[f]reedom of expression' does not mean 
freedom to copy the form in which authors have expressed themselves .... " 
In order to meaningfully consider this assumption, it is necessary to define some 
terms. It has been argued that a valid distinction between ideas and expression cannot 
be drawn. However, a distinction between ideas and form can be drawn if form is 
defined so that in relation to a literary work, it means the actual words used, and in 
relation to a visual work, it means an exact copy of the visual image. Nevertheless it 
is submitted that the proposition that freedom of expression never requires the 
appropriation of form can be disproved. 
An example is provided by the case of Time Inc v Bernard Geis Associates. 
58 This case 
concerned a home video of the assassination of President Kennedy, which was filmed 
by an onlooker. The rights to the film were bought by the plaintiff. The defendant 
wrote a book which was a study of the assassination and included certain still shots 
taken from the video . The plaintiff sued for copyright infringement. 
It was clear that reproduction of the photos constituted a copying of form, since the 
photos were taken directly from the video, so portrayed exactly the same visual 
image. 59 The judgment was focused on the fair use defence, and whether this 
excused the taking.(,o The issue for present purposes, and one not addressed in the 
case, is whether freedom of expression required the use of the photographs 
themselves, in spite of the fact that this was a copying of form. 
Nimmer argues that in a matter of such extreme public importance, freedom of 
expression demands that the film be freely available to the public.
6 1 He argues that a 
verbal description of what happened (a reproduction of the "idea") would hardly 
compensate for seeing the actual footage. No words could adequately express the 
idea contained in the film. Nimmer argues that the actual visual impact of the 
photographs would contribute to the democratic dialogue. 
Another example is where the copying of exact words may be necessary for freedom 
of expression. Consider again the facts of Harper & Row, 
62 concerning the memoirs of 
the former President Ford. The defendant's article contained some material that was 
5R 
<,I 
62 
293 F Supp 130 (1968) . 
Above n 58, 144. 
This aspect of the case is discussed further below at section VIII D. 
Above n 8, 1.88-1.89. 
Above n 46. 
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quoted directly from the memoirs. It is arguable that use of Ford's actual words was 
necessary to adequately convey Ford's feelings and opinions to the public. r,:, 
These examples are sufficient to rebut the proposition that freedom of expression 
never requires the copying of form. Therefore a distinction between form and 
content cannot provide adequate protection for freedom of expression any more than 
it can adequately define the scope of copyright protection. It is necessary to consider 
other ways to protect the freedom to use copyright material in these examples. 
In conclusion, the idea-expression dichotomy which many writers and judges rely on 
to justify their view that freedom of expression and copyright do not conflict does not 
work. If one is to argue that the law of copyright already incorporates sufficient 
protections for freedom of expression, a better justification than the idea-expression 
dichotomy will be required. Some writers and judges put forward the defence of fair 
use for this purpose. 
VIII THE ROLE OF FAIR DEALING AND FAIR USE 
A The New Zealand Defence of Fair Dealing 
In New Zealand, the defence of fair dealing is contained in sections 42 and 43 of the 
Copyright Act 1994. Section 42 relates to criticism, review and news reporting. It 
provides that "fair dealing" with a work for the purposes of" criticism or review" 
does not infringe copyright if accompanied by a sufficient acknowledgement. r,
4 Fair 
dealing with a work for the purposes of reporting current events by means of a sound 
recording, film, broadcast or cable programme also does not infringe copyright in the 
work.65 
Similarly, section 43 provides that fair dealing with a work for the purposes of 
"research or private study" does not infringe copyright in the work. Section 42(3) 
then sets out five factors to which the court must have regard in determining whether 
a use constitutes fair dealing for the purposes of research or private study. These are : 
(,4 
65 
(a) The purpose of the copying; and 
(b) The nature of the work copied; and 
(c) Whether the work could have been obtained within a reasonable time 
at an ordinary commercial price; and 
Above n 8, 1.99. 
Subsection (1). 
Subsection (2) . 
LAV'.' L:E:: 
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(d) The effect of the copying on the potential market for, or value of, the 
work; and 
(e) Where part of a work is copied, the amount and substantiality of the 
part copied in relation to the whole work. 
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These factors are also taken into account by the courts in determining whether a 
dealing is fair under section 42. c,c, 
B The US Defence of Fair Use 
Because of the rich jurisprudence surrounding the corresponding defence in the 
United States (the defence of fair use) it is useful to consider the scope of the US 
defence. 
The US defence of fair use was developed by judges. It has now been codified in 
section 107 of the Federal Copyright Act 1976. Section 107 provides that the "fair 
use" of a copyright work is not an infringement of copyright. The section lists some 
purposes (criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching etc) but these are not 
exhaustive. There are four factors which the court must take into account in 
determining whether any particular use is a fair use. With some minor differences in 
wording, these are the same factors as (a), (b), (d) and (e) in section 43 of the New 
Zealand Copyright Act, with some minor differences in wording. So the major 
difference between the US defence and the New Zealand defence is that the US 
defence is not limited to specified purposes. 
C Fair Use and Fair Dealing as a Complete Protection for Freedom of Expression 
There has been much discussion in US judicial and academic writing as to the First 
Amendment implications of the fair use defence, and how the two concepts inter-
relate.67 One view is that fair use provides complete protection for First Amendment 
<,<, 
67 
B Brown, D Brown and C Elliot Intellectual Property in New Zealand: Cvpynght and Design 
(Buttervvorths, Wellington, 1996) 454-455. 
Goldstein , above n 47; R Denicola " Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on 
the Protection of Expression" (1979) 67 California Law Review 283; Patry, above n 40; L 
Wang "The First Amendment Exception to Copyright: A Proposed Test" (1977) Wisconsin 
Law Review 1157; H Rosenfield "The American Constitution, Free Inquiry, and the Law" inJ 
Lawrence and B Timberg Fair Use and Free Inquiry (Ablex Publishing Corporation, New Jersey, 
1980) 287-308; P Hans "Triangle v Knight-Ridder Newspapers " (1979) Wisconsin Law 
Review 242. 
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values.r,H On this view, the fair use defence is an internal mechanism of copyright 
which ensures that all uses which enhance First Amendment values, are not infringing 
uses. 
Part of the reasoning behind this view is the idea that the fair use doctrine espouses 
the same policies as the First Amendment. Whereas the First Amendment "promotes 
the dissemination of information by ensuring that Congress will pass no law abridging 
the freedom of speech", the fair use doctrine "promotes the dissemination of 
information by limiting the extent to which the expression of ideas can be 
monopolised by copyright proprietors. ,,m Therefore it has been argued that if the fair 
use doctrine had not been developed, the same goals could have been achieved by 
. h F. A d 70 usmg t e 1rst men ment. 
However, it may be stretching things somewhat to argue that the fair use doctrine was 
developed specifically in order to further First Amendment interests. The primary 
purpose of fair use is to ensure that copyright protection does not stifle the creativity 
which it is supposed to foster. Fair use is needed to allow subsequent authors to build 
on what has gone before. Therefore fair use is not directed to information or its 
dissemination, but to the economic rationale of encouraging creativity.
71 
D Freedom of Expression and the Fair Use Factors: the US Case Law 
In applying the defence of fair use, the US courts must have regard to the four factors 
in section 107 of the Federal Copyright Act.
72 The issue is how freedom of 
expression principles are promoted by these factors. 
1 The purpose of the use 
In the US provision, this factor includes the words "whether the use is of a 
commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes". Judicial consideration 
of this factor appears to focus on the actual motive of the defendant in copying the 
material. Freedom of expression considerations can be relevant here. If the defendant 
(,H 
(ii) 
70 
71 
72 
One writer who holds this view is Goldstein, above n 47. Cases which have held that the 
doctrine of fair use ensures protection for freedom of expression in relation to copyright works 
are: Harper[,,- Ruw, above n 46; and Tn'angle v Knight-Ridder Publicatiuns, above n 48. 
Above n 67, 256. 
Above n 67, 256. 
Denicola, above n 67, 301. 
The four factors are set out in A and B of this section. 
used the material with the intention of disseminating information that is of public 
interest, the defence of fair use is more likely to succeed than if the defendant 
intended solely to make a profit. 
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One case illustrating this is Keep Thomson Governor Committee v Citizens for Gallen 
Committee. 
73 This case concerned rival candidates in a political campaign. The 
defendant made a political broadcast which included most of a song which the 
plaintiff had rights over, and had used in its own political broadcast. Judge Devine 
emphasised that the discussion of public issues and debate over candidates for an 
election is integral to the democratic system of government. Considering the purpose 
of the use, he stated that the purpose was clearly for a political broadcast, and was 
entirely non-commercial. Judge Devine therefore found for the defendant on the 
ground of fair use . 
74 
Considerations of purpose are also raised where material which is of public 
importance is published by a newspaper or other organisation for a profit. But here it 
is not so clear-cut. The motive for publishing may include a wish to disseminate 
information, but is rarely free from any desire to benefit commercially. 
Unsurprisingly judicial views on this issue are varied. 
An early case considering this issue was Rosemont Enterprises Inc v Random House Inc.
75 
In that case, the plaintiff had published some articles on the life of a famous person, 
Howard Hughes. Twelve years later, the defendant published a biography of Howard 
Hughes which copied parts of the plaintiff's articles. The court stated that in 
considering the later publisher's purpose, a defendant's commercial motive is 
irrelevant where the public interest in the work is substantial and it found that if an 
injunction was granted, this would deprive the public of an opportunity to learn 
about the life of Howard Hughes, who had made substantial contributions to his 
field. 76 
The Kennedy photos case referred to the decision in Rosemont, and suggested that it 
gave too much weight to the "public interest".
77 Nevertheless, the judge went on to 
find that the defendant's use of the film of President Kennedy's assassination was a fair 
use, primarily because of the substantial public interest in the film. 
73 457 F Supp 957 (1978) . 
74 Above 11 73, 959-960. 
75 366 F 2d 303 (1 966) . 
7<, Above 11 75, 309. 
77 Above n 58, 145. 
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In contrast, the majority of the Supreme Court in Harper & Row, the Ford memoirs 
case, found that the commercial motive of the defendant was an important 
consideration. In considering the purpose of the use, Justice O'Connor of the 
majority identified it as news reporting. However, Justice O'Connor thought that the 
use went beyond this and "actively sought to exploit the headline value ... of its 
unauthorised first publication .... " The crucial issue here was not whether the use was 
commercial, since most uses will have some commercial element, but whether "the 
user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the 
. ,, 78 
customary pnce . 
In contrast, Justice Brennan of the minority argued that the majority was wrong to 
place emphasis on the defendant's commercial motive in the circumstances of the 
case. He stated that the news business is a competitive one, relying for its livelihood 
" . . 1 " 79 on scoopmg nva s . 
In conclusion, given our earlier observation that fair use is primarily concerned to 
protect the economic incentive for copyright, it is submitted that the fourth factor, 
whether the defendant's use will affect the value of, or potential market for, the work, 
should be given more weight than the factor of whether the use is primarily 
commercial. This means that freedom of expression considerations can prevail unless 
the copyright owner's market for the work is substantially diminished by the use. 
2 The nature of the work 
The second factor is the nature of the work. This includes any public interest in the 
content of the work, and was given prominence in the Howard Hughes and Kennedy 
photos cases. In those two cases, the public interest involved was the public's right to 
know or to see certain things, the right to freedom of expression. 
In the Kennedy case, the judge placed reliance on the fact that the defendant's book 
was a "serious, thoughtful and impressive analysis of the evidence" and that the 
defendant's theory was "serious work on the subject and ... entitled to public 
consideration". 
Therefore this factor could be used to import freedom of expression considerations 
into the defence of fair dealing. 
7N 
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Above n 46, 608. 
Above n 46, 627. 
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3 Amount and substantiality 
The third factor ((e) in the New Zealand Act) is the amount and substantiality of the 
portion of the work taken in relation to the work as a whole. It is useful to judge this 
factor against the purpose of the defendant's use. If the defendant's purpose is to 
disseminate information which the public has a right to know, the defendant should 
be allowed to appropriate only as much of the plaintiff's work as is necessary to 
h. h" 80 ac 1eve t 1s purpose. 
The assessment of necessity can involve a consideration of what should be protected 
by freedom of expression . An example is Harper & Row, where direct quotes were 
taken from the President's memoirs. A court could find that the entire quotes were 
necessary for freedom of expression to be vindicated, because the quotes themselves 
were needed to express the idea, or because the quotes themselves were something 
that the public had a right to know. Another example is the Kennedy photos case, 
where the court would decide whether publication of the actual pictures was 
necessary for the public to be informed. 
The necessity criterion is also relevant to factor (c) in the New Zealand Act: whether 
the work could have been obtained within a reasonable time at an ordinary 
commercial price. If there is alternative access to the information, then the public 
interest in hearing that information will hardly ever excuse a copyright infringement. 
The amount and substantiality of the portion of the work taken can therefore 
incorporate freedom of expression concerns by allowing the defendant to use only 
portions which are necessary to promote the open discussion of public affairs. 
4 Effect of the use upon the potential market for the work 
The final factor is the effect of the use upon the potential market for, or value of, the 
work. In the US case law, this factor has historically been the most important of the 
four factors.
81 This reflects the primary purpose of fair dealing and fair use: to allow 
authors to build on what has gone before, provided any subsequent author's use does 
not remove the economic incentive to create. 
In summary, freedom of expression concerns can be incorporated into consideration 
of the fair use defence through these four factors. 
HO 
HI 
Denicola, above n 67, 306-310. 
Hans, above n 67, 247. 
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In New Zealand, section 6 of the Bill of Rights means that the fair dealing provisions 
can be interpreted in accordance with freedom of expression principles. However, 
the problem with using the New Zealand defence of fair dealing as a protection for 
freedom of expression is that it applies only in prescribed situations, so cannot act as a 
general principle. 
E Fair Dealing in the New Zealand Copyright Act 
The particular exceptions in sections 41 to 43 of the New Zealand Copyright Act are 
for criticism and review, news reporting and research and private study. Some other 
permitted uses in the Copyright Act pertain to education, libraries and public 
administration. It is submitted that all of these purposes are permitted because they 
are non-profit, or if they involve profit, they do not affect the market for the 
copyright holder's work. 
The terms "criticism and review" are construed narrowly by the courts.
82 The 
paradigm situation envisaged by these words is a book review style article which 
directly criticises the book, and includes some extracts. The criticism and review 
defence then protects the use of these extracts. However, this is a use which, even if 
motivated by profit, will not affect the potential market for the copyright holder's 
work. Therefore it does not threaten the economic incentive for copyright. 
The defence of "reporting current events" does allow the dissemination of 
information which may be in the public interest. However, it is limited in that the 
events reported must actually be current. The defence cannot apply to events which 
are of only historical interest.
83 This means that in New Zealand, for example, the 
use of President Ford's memoirs would not be protected because the events described 
are not current. Further, the news reporting defence in New Zealand does not cover 
photographs,
84 thereby excluding the Kennedy photos from immunity. 
Although the news reporting defence does further freedom of expression, it is notable 
that use of a work for the purposes of reporting current events is unlikely to have an 
effect on the market for the copyright holder's work. Indeed, if anything, it is likely 
to improve its marketability. Therefore it is unlikely to threaten the economic 
incentive for copyright. 
K2 
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Lastly, the defence of "research or private study" was considered by Blanchard J in 
Newsmonitor. 
85 He stated that "research or private study" could include research done 
by a company for its own profit. However, he found that it did not extend to the 
activities of Newsmonitor, since Newsmonitor did not do any research or study of its 
own. It simply passed the material on, for a profit, to organisations which used it for 
research. Blanchard J emphasised the fact that Newsmonitor's activities would 
destroy the economic incentive for TVNZ to produce transcripts.
8
(' 
Therefore, while the defence of fair dealing can protect freedom of expression to 
some degree, its usefulness is limited in New Zealand since it is narrowly prescribed. 
In particular, it cannot protect the two example uses of the Kennedy photos and the 
quotes from the Ford memoirs. Lastly, an examination of the categories of work that 
fair dealing applies to has shown that the motivation behind each of them is more 
likely to be economic than concerned with freedom of expression. 
IX THE EFFECT OF SECTION 14 
A Introduction 
In the United States, some writers have come to the same conclusion, that fair use is 
not an adequate protection for freedom of expression since fair use primarily protects 
economic interests. These writers argue that a separate "First Amendment" defence is 
required for cases where disclosure is desirable in the interests of free speech. 
87 
This approach is not possible in New Zealand since, unlike the First Amendment, 
section 14 of the Bill of Rights cannot override any other statute. 
However, the Copyright Act 1994 still leaves scope for the development of a defence 
to protect the interests of freedom of expression. Section 225 of the 1994 Act deals 
with "Rights and Privileges under Other Enactments or Common Law". Subsection 
(3) provides that: 
K5 
Hu 
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Nothing in this Act affects any rule oflaw preventing or restricting the enforcement of 
copyright, on grounds of public interest or otherwise. 
Above n 1, 105-107. 
Above n 1, 108. 
Denicola, above 1167, 304-316; Rosenfield, above n 67. However, the First Amendment 
defence has not finally been upheld by any court. The defence was relied on in the District 
Court in Tn·anglc v Knight-Ridder 445 F Supp 875 (1978), but the Court of Appeals based its 
decision solely on fair use. 
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This section is potentially extremely powerful. It allows the Copyright Act to be 
overridden, which is not possible using the Bill of Rights alone. However, it is 
im.portant to note that section 225(3) does not state that copyright protection can be 
ignored whenever this is in the public interest. The section is clear that it does not 
allow a principle to override copyright protection unless (1) the principle is 
sufficiently established to count as a "rule of law"; and (2) it is a rule oflaw relating to 
the enforcement of copyright rather than to its existence. 
88 
It is necessary to decide which rules of law are preserved by section 225 (3). The 
section is copied from section 171(3) of the English Copyright, Designs and Patents 
Act 1988, which suggests that guidance can be obtained from English case law. The 
following section considers the principles of English law which fall within section 
225(3), and assesses each of them to decide whether they are relevant to a defence 
which aims to promote freedom of expression. 
B The "Public Interest" in English Case Law 
In the English case law, the term "public interest defence" is often used. However, it 
appears that what is being considered in these cases is not one defence, but a number 
of principles which relate to the "public interest" and which affect copyright law in 
some way. 
Many of these principles derive from the action for breach of confidence (not 
copyright) which arises where (1) there is confidential information; (2) that is 
communicated to the confidant in circumstances which import an obligation of 
confidence and (3) the information is used by the confidant or a third party to the 
detriment of the confider. 
1 Disclosure of wrongdoing 
The origin of this principle appears to be the early breach of confidence case of 
Gartside v Outram.
81
; In that case, Wood VC stated that " ... there is no confidence as 
h d. 1 f . . . " H h 
90 
to t e 1sc osure o an m1qmty . e went on to state t at: 
RH 
H'J 
90 
You cannot make me the confidant of a crime or fraud, and be entitled to close my 
lips upon any secret which you have the audacity to disclose to me relating to any 
fraudulent intention on your part: such a confidence cannot exist. 
Laddie et al, above n 39, 117. 
(1856) 26 LJ Ch 113. 
Above n 89, 114. 
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Since Gartside v Outram, a public interest defence based on iniquity has developed in 
the cases. 
Beleff v Pressdram91 was the first to suggest that this "public interest" defence could 
apply to breach of copyright as well as confidence. In that case, the plaintiff, an 
employee of a newspaper, wrote a memorandum containing certain allegations about 
a member of the government. The memorandum was internal, to other employees of 
the newspaper. Later, the contents of the memorandum were communicated to the 
defendant by phone. The defendant published an article attacking the plaintiff, and 
quoting in full the plaintiff's memorandum. The plaintiff sued for breach of copyright 
in the memorandum, and the defendant argued that it was protected by the defence 
of public interest. 
Ungoed-Thomas J stated that " ... public interest is a defence outside and independent 
of statutes, is not limited to copyright cases and is based on a general principle of 
common law. "92 In enunciating this "general principle of common law", Ungoed-
Thomas J relied on the case of Initial Services v Putterill. 
93 Initial Services involved an 
action for breach of confidence. In his judgment, Lord Denning had stated that the 
public interest defence to an action for breach of confidence: 
.. . should extend to crimes, frauds and misdeeds, both those actually committed as well 
as those in contemplation, provided always - and this is essential - that the disclosure is 
justified in the public interest. 
After considering Initial Services, Ungoed-Thomas Jin Beloff stated that the defence 
extends to: 
94 
... matters carried out or contemplated, in breach of the country's security, or in 
breach oflaw, including statutory duty, fraud, or otherwise destructive of the country 
or its people, including matters medically dangerous to the public; and doubtless other 
misdeeds of similar gravity. 
This statement includes three categories of situation covered by the defence: (1) acts 
in breach of national security; (2) acts in breach oflaw and (3) matters involving 
danger to the public. It will be noted that matters involving danger to the public do 
not necessarily involve disclosure of wrongdoing. 
91 [1973] 1 All ER 241. 
92 Above 11 91, 259. 
'J3 [1967] 3 All ER 145. 
')4 Above 11 91, 260. 
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On the facts of Belo.ff v Pressdram, the defendant argued that the publication of the 
memorandum was in the public interest since the public should know which minister 
the plaintiff had obtained her information from. The plaintiff argued that generally, it 
was against the public interest to reveal media sources . 
Ungoed-Thomas J admitted that it was a matter of "public importance". However, 
in his view the defence failed because the memorandum did not disclose any "iniquity 
or misdeed" -9=' 
The decision in Bclo..ff was considered by Mason J in Commonwealth of Australia v John 
Faiifax & Sons Limited. 9/i In that case, the Australian government possessed a 
confidential document which contained material relating to the government's part in 
the East Timar crisis. The defendant obtained this document and intended to publish 
extracts from it in its newspaper. Some copies of the newspaper were published, and 
copies of the book released outside Australia, before interim injunctions could be 
obtained. 
Mason J stated that a limited public interest defence may be available for copyright, as 
suggested in Belqff v Pressdram, but that if it was available for copyright, its scope 
would be limited to: 
97 
... the publication of confidential information or material in which copyright subsists so 
as to protect the community from destruction, damage or harm ... the defence applies 
to disclosures of things done in breach of national security, in breach of the law 
(including fraud) and to disclosure of matters which involve danger to the public. 
This statement appears to contain the same three categories of situation identified by 
Ungoed-Thomas J in Bclcff. harm to the public, national security and breach oflaw. 
On the facts of Faiifax, the information related to the government's motive in a past 
event. Therefore it was not current so as to be a danger to national security. Mason J 
stated that to apply the defence in such a situation would "break new ground".
98 
The clef ence of disclosure of wrongdoing was considered again by the House of Lords 
in Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2), 
99 the "Spycatcher" case. 
()5 
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Spycatcher was a book written by a former member of the MIS, Peter Wright. The 
book was essentially Wright's memoirs, and it contained allegations about various 
members of the British Secret Service. One such allegation was a plot to assassinate a 
public military figure, Colonel Nasser. The British government brought proceedings 
in several countries to attempt to prevent the publication of the book or the 
information contained within it. However, the information was available in several 
overseas countries before it was released in England, and overseas copies of the book 
were imported and sold in England. 
In England, extracts from the book were printed by various newspapers before 
interim injunctions could be obtained. In the House of Lords, the issue was whether 
the Crown was entitled to a permanent injunction for breach of confidence by the 
newspapers. 
Lord Keith found that the defence of disclosure of wrongdoing did not excuse the 
publication of Spycatcher. Although Spycatcher contained some allegations of 
wrongdoing, such as the alleged plot to kill Colonel Nasser, these allegations formed a 
very small part of the book and were not substantial enough to justify disclosing the 
whole contents of the book. 
100 
Lord Griffiths stated that: 
101 
The only possible exception ... would be the public interest defence ..... theoretically, 
if a member of the service discovered that some iniquitous course of action was being 
pursued that was clearly detrimental to our national interest, and he was unable to 
persuade any senior members of his service or any member of the establishment, or the 
police, to do anything about it, then he should be relieved of his duty of confidence so 
that he could alert his fellow citizens to the impending danger. 
This was not the case in Spycatcher since the accusations made up a small proportion of 
the book and they were not current so did not involve any "impending danger". 
2 Relevance of disclosure of wrongdoing to freedom of expression defence 
It is submitted that the disclosure of wrongdoing is not a suitable criterion to include 
in a defence which aims to protect freedom of expression. To see why this is the 
CJCJ 
100 
1111 
[1988] 3 All ER 638. 
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case, consider the "public interest" alleged to be promoted by allowing disclosure of 
wrongdoing. 
There are two public interests involved: the prevention of harm, and the effective 
administration of justice.
102 If the disclosure relates to wrongdoing which is proposed 
to be done, then it is in the public interest to allow this disclosure so that the harm 
does not occur. For example, if it were disclosed in confidence that a robbery was to 
be committed, the confidant would be justified in breaching the confidence to 
prevent the robbery from occurring. 
If the disclosure relates to past wrongdoing, the public interest in the prevention of 
harm is promoted by catching and punishing the wrongdoer so that she cannot 
perpetrate further harm. 
Consider these public interests against those protected by freedom of expression: the 
open discussion of public affairs, the marketplace of ideas and the value of individual 
autonomy. The revelation of past or intended wrongs does not have any special 
effect on the marketplace of ideas, nor on the right to individual autonomy. 
However, the revelation of past or intended wrongs may have an effect on the open 
discussion of public affairs if the wrongs are committed by public figures or if they 
have an effect on public affairs. So the revelation that a government Minister is 
corrupt is a disclosure of wrongdoing which promotes one of the interests behind 
freedom of expression. However, the importance of the disclosure for freedom of 
expression is not that it prevents harm but that it enables voters to be informed and 
therefore the democratic system to be enhanced. 
The other public interest promoted by the disclosure of wrongdoing is the effective 
administration of justice. It is in the public interest that disclosures of wrongdoing be 
made so that the wrongdoers can be effectively dealt with by the justice system. 
Generally, the effective functioning of the justice system does not promote the open 
discussion of public affairs, the marketplace of ideas or individual autonomy. 
However, public scrutiny of the effectiveness of the justice system is an interest 
protected by freedom of expression. So while freedom of expression is not especially 
concerned with whether an individual wrongdoer is brought to justice, the justice 
system as a whole is a public institution about which the public should be informed so 
that they can fulfil their democratic functions effectively. 
!02 J Pizer "The Public Interest Exception to the Breach of Confidence Action: Are the Lights 
About to Clm1ge'" (1994) 20 Monash University Law Review 6 7, 70, 75 . 
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It is submitted that the limitation of the "public interest defence" to wrongdoing and 
breaches of national security in Belo.ff, Faiifax and Spycatcher meant that freedom of 
expression was not adequately considered. For example, in Belo.ff, Ungoed-Thomas J 
summarily dismissed the defendant's argument that the public had a right to know 
about the matters involved in the memorandum because the memorandum did not 
disclose any "iniquity or misdeed". 
Similarly, in Faiifax, the fact that the infom1ation related to past events meant that it 
was not protected by the public interest defence. However, information about past 
events in government may be a legitimate topic for public knowledge and discussion. 
In Spycatcher, the fact that the allegation of wrongdoing was a small part of the overall 
publication, and the fact that it was no longer current, led Their Lordships to find that 
Wright would not have been able to rely on the public interest defence. There was 
therefore little discussion of whether the public's right to be informed could justify 
Wright's disclosure. 
3 Matters involving danger to the public 
One of the other categories of "public interest defence" mentioned in Belcff and 
Faiifax is where the information should be disclosed because it involves danger to the 
public. This category appears to be based on the case of Hubbard v Vosper. 
103 The 
defendant in Hubbard was a member of the Church of Scientology. After leaving the 
Church, the defendant wrote a book criticising its teachings. The book contained 
substantial extracts from the writings of the plaintiff, the head of the Church of 
Scientology. 
The plaintiff sued for breach of copyright and breach of confidence. The court found 
that there was no infringement of copyright since the defence of fair dealing applied. 
In relation to breach of confidence, Lord Denning stated that "[t)here are some things 
which may be required to be disclosed in the public interest, in which event no 
confidence can be prayed in aid to keep them secret." 
104 
Lord Denning considered that there were good grounds for thinking that the writings 
of the defendant fell within the category of things which ought to be disclosed in the 
public interest. This was because they contained "medical quackeries of a sort which 
may be dangerous if practised behind closed doors." 
105 
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The public danger principle was also considered by the English Court of Appeal in 
Lion Laboratories Ltd v Evans. 106 The plaintiff was manufacturer of an electronic 
device which was used to measure breath alcohol levels for the purposes of 
convictions for driving under the influence. The defendants obtained some of the 
plaintifrs internal documents which cast doubt on the accuracy of those devices. 
These documents were published by the defendants, in newspapers. 
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The plaintiff sought an injunction on the grounds of breach of confidence and breach 
of copyright. The defendants raised the defence of public interest. Two of the 
judges 107 indicated that the public interest defence was available for breach of 
copyright. One of the two stated that for the purposes of the case, there was no 
difference between copyright and confidence.
108 The third judge 109 did not mention 
copyright, but based his decision on breach of confidence. 
On the facts of Lion Laboratories, the information disclosed did not reveal any 
wrongdoing. However, the Court held that the defence should be extended beyond 
the disclosure of wrongdoing. Wrongdoing was held to be merely an example of a 
situation which might justify disclosure in the public interest. 
110 
The disclosure of information about the breath testing devices was found to be 
justified because of the potentially serious consequences. 
111 Use of the devices could 
result in conviction. This meant that it was in the public interest that information 
which cast doubt on their accuracy be made publicly known. The court found this to 
be "just cause and excuse" for the breach of copyright and confidence. 112 
This statement has led to the public interest defence, previously called the "iniquity 
defence", being referred to as the ''just cause and excuse" defence. However, the 
Court in Lion Laboratories gave little guidance as to the new scope of the defence, 
except to say that it will be an "exceptional case"113 where the defence applies. 
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4 Freedom of expression and danger to the public 
In relation to danger to the public, similar considerations to those considered above 
for prevention of harm apply. The facts of Lion Laboratories raised a freedom of 
expression issue in that the public should be aware of a defect which could lead to 
wrongful convictions. However, the fact that an individual might suffer harm as a 
result of the faulty device is not a concern of freedom of expression. 
5 Role of the public interest where the plaintiff is government 
There is a line of breach of confidence cases where the "public interest" has been 
used in determining detriment to the plaintiff, where the plaintiff is the government. 
In these cases, the public interest is not characterised as a defence, but as an element 
of the detriment which the plaintiff has to prove in order to restrain the disclosure of 
confidential information. 
One such case is Faiifax, 
114 the Australian case in which the government sought to 
restrain the disclosure of documents relating to the East Timor crisis . It will be 
recalled that the case was argued on the basis of breach of confidence and copyright. 
When considering breach of confidence, Mason J characterised the issue as what 
detriment the government needed to show in order to support a breach of confidence 
action. Mason J stated that: 115 
It may be a sufficient detriment to the citizen that disclosure of information relating to 
his affairs will expose his actions to public discussion and criticism. But it can scarcely 
be relevant detriment to the government that publication of material concerning its 
actions will merely expose it to public discussion and criticism. It is unacceptable in 
our democratic society that there should be a restraint on the publication of 
information relating to government when the only vice of that information is that it 
enables the public to discuss, review and criticise government action. 
Mason J went on to state that detriment where the plaintiff is the government is to be 
judged according to the public interest, and an injunction is not to be granted unless 
the plaintiff can show that disclosure would be harmful to the public interest. Mason 
J stated that it is not sufficient detriment to show that the disclosure will reveal the 
114 Above 11 96. 
115 Above 11 96, 52. 
workings of government. The disclosure must obstruct the workings of government 
or threaten national security or foreign relations before it will be restrained.
11 r, 
On the facts of Faiifax, the information had already been released in other countries, 
including Indonesia and the United States , which had the most interest in the events 
surrounding the East Timar crisis. Therefore an injunction would have been 
ineffective to prevent damage to the national security.
11 7 
Despite this , Mason J found for the plaintiff on the ground of copyright 
· C · 11 8 mmngement. 
The House of Lords in Spycatchcr approved and applied Mason J's approach from 
Faiifax. Their Lordships considered whether the Crown had demonstrated a public 
interest that justified restraining the disclosure of the information, and unanimously 
found that since the book had already been published in several other countries 
" ... general publication in [England) would not bring about any significant damage to 
the public interest beyond what has already been done." 
11 9 This was a key point in 
the case. It was clear that had the information not already been disclosed, the Crown 
would have been entitled to an injunction because of the danger it posed to the 
. 1 . 1211 nationa secunty. 
6 Freedom of expression and the government's right to restrain disclosure 
The approach of Faiifax and Spycatcher to the detriment element of a breach of 
confidence action is not directly applicable to copyright since an action for 
infringement of copyright does not require the plaintiff to show detriment. 
However, the approach is useful in that it highlights the different interests that are 
involved when the person seeking to restrain disclosure is the government rather than 
a private individual. In a copyright case, the person seeking to restrain the defendant's 
use is usually motivated by her own economic interests. However, the documents 
involved in Faiifax were not commercially motivated. The danger was not that the 
defendant would adversely affect the Crown's market for the documents by 
distributing copies. Rather the concern was that the Crown did not want the 
II <, Above 11 96, 52 . 
11 7 Above 11 96, 54. 
11 8 Above 11 96, 58 . 
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documents to be disclosed at all. The interests of national security are vastly different 
from the economic interests of most copyright holders. 
The approach of Faiifax and Spycatcher is also useful in that it emphasises that a court 
should be especially suspicious when it is the government that is seeking to restrain 
the disclosure of information. The idea of a government keeping its operations secret 
from the voting public is directly opposed to the open discussion of public affairs 
which freedom of expression aims to protect. To this extent, a court's consideration 
of this principle does promote freedom of expression.
121 
Faiifax and Spycatcher are also useful in that they indicate that the national security is 
an important overriding concern. In terms of a Bill of Rights analysis, this will be 
relevant to determining whether a limit on freedom of expression is reasonable and 
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society in terms of section 5. 
C The Role of the Public Interest in the Balancing Process 
In any action for breach of confidence, the first step is to establish the elements of the 
cause of action. Once this is done, the court will balance the competing public 
interests involved to decide whether relief should be granted. In a breach of 
confidence action, one of these interests is always the public interest in preserving 
confidential relationships. This interest is balanced or weighed against any 
countervailing public interest that favours disclosure of the information. 
This balancing process was undertaken in Lion Laboratories. The public interest in 
preserving confidences was balanced against the public interest in knowing 
information relating to the accuracy of the breath testing devices. 
122 
Lord Griffiths undertook a similar process in Spycatcher. On the facts of the case, His 
Lordship balanced the claim of the Crown that disclosure would prejudice national 
security against the "other countervailing interest of freedom of speech and the right 
of the people in a democracy to be informed by a free press. "
123 This balancing was 
done with reference to the guarantee of freedom of expression contained in Article 10 
121 
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important overriding concern. In tenm of a Bill of Rights analysis, this will be relevant to 
deten11ining whether a limit on freedom of expression is reasonable and can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society in tenm of section 5. 
Above n 106, 536. 
Above n 99, 649. 
41 
of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
124 This 
suggests that freedom of expression is in itself a public interest to which the public 
should have regard. 
D Freedom of Expression, Copyright and the Balancing Process 
The balancing of public interests that occurs in every breach of confidence case as a 
matter of course does not arise in deciding whether copyright subsists in a work, and 
whether it has been infringed. Nevertheless, a type of balancing can occur in 
applying a defence to copyright. Applying the defence of fair dealing involves 
balancing the economic interests of the copyright holder against the public interest in 
having the material available for use. 
It is submitted that in applying a "public interest" or freedom of expression defence to 
copyright, the balance should be between the public interest in the copying or 
dissemination of the work, and the public interest in maintaining the author's 
copyright. The public interest in the copying or dissemination of the work is the 
interest the public has in freedom of expression. The public interest in maintaining 
the author's copyright is the public interest in protecting the economic incentive for 
authors to create and disseminate original works. It is necessary to balance these two 
interests to see which one should prevail in the circumstances of the case. 
In terms of the Bill of Rights, this balancing process can be seen as an application of 
the purposive approach. The individual economic right of the copyright holder is not 
considered in isolation, but in light of its purpose: to provide an economic incentive 
to produce original works. If the public interest in copying or disseminating the work 
is great, and if it does not undercut, or does not substantially undercut, the public 
interest in the economic incentive for copyright, then the work should be allowed to 
be copied or disseminated. 
X PROPOSAL FOR A SECTION 14 DEFENCE FOR NEW ZEALAND 
A Initial Considerations 
The previous section considered the principles of the common law which are 
preserved by section 225(3) of the Copyright Act 1994. The issue now is to decide 
how to develop these principles into a defence which protects freedom of expression 
for New Zealand. 
124 Article 10(1) of the European Convention was discussed above at section III D. 
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In applying the common law "public interest" principles to the New Zealand 
situation under section 225(3), the Bill of Rights is an important consideration. 
Developing, enunciating and applying principles of the common law are judicial acts 
which are subject to the Bill of Rights.
12s Therefore it is legitimate for a judge to 
consider these rights in deciding a case based on common law principles. 
In fact, this use of the Bill of Rights is potentially more powerful than its use as a 
statutory interpretation tool, because although an inconsistent statute overrides the 
Bill of Rights, there is no provision stating that an inconsistent common law rule has 
the same effect. Therefore, in so far as an area of law is not regulated by statute, 
judges are free to use the Bill of Rights to develop the principles oflaw in this area. 
12
(' 
Therefore, there is scope in New Zealand for the development of a "section 14" 
defence to copyright for the purpose of protecting the interests of freedom of 
expression as guaranteed in section 14 of the Bill of Rights. 
B Proposal for Section 14 Defence 
It is useful to analyse what steps the court would need to take in deciding whether the 
proposed section 14 defence applies. The first stage in the court's inquiry would be 
to consider whether the defendant's use of the plaintiff's material, which would 
otherwise infringe copyright, advances the interests of freedom of expression. If the 
use genuinely promotes freedom of expression, the second stage would be to consider 
all the relevant circumstances surrounding the defendant's use. If the circumstances 
favour the defendant, the final stage would be to balance the interest in protecting 
freedom of expression against the interest in protecting copyright. If the balancing 
favours freedom of expression the use would be protected by the defence.
127 
1 The.first stage: does the defendant's use advance an interest protected by freedom of 
expression? 
At this initial stage of the inquiry, the task of the court should be to decide the 
threshold question: whether the defendant's use genuinely advances one of the three 
interests protected by freedom of expression: (1) the open discussion of public affairs; 
125 
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(2) the attainment of truth through the marketplace of ideas; and (3) the value of self-
express10n. 
2 The second stage: the circumstances surrounding the defendant's use 
It is useful to consider which circumstances would be relevant for the purposes of a 
section 14 defence. 
(a) identity of person making disclosure 
This factor is important in breach of confidence cases. 
128 This is because a 
confidential relationship is formed between the confider and the confidant, and 
disclosure by the confidant can be justified only on limited grounds. The duty of 
confidence is primarily owed by the confidant, and extends to third parties only in 
limited circumstances. 
In the case of copyright, the position is different. The duty not to breach copyright 
does not arise from any special relationship between the copyright holder and another 
person. Therefore the identity of the person making use of the copyright material is 
less important than the identity of the person making the disclosure in a confidence 
case. The identity of the person making use of copyright material becomes relevant 
only if there is some special permission for that person to do so. 
In the context of freedom of expression, the issue is usually disclosure by a third party. 
A party to a confidential relationship may be taken to have waived his or her right to 
freedom of expression by entering into the relationship. It is also arguable that a 
limitation on freedom of expression which prevents the immediate parties to a 
confidential relationship from breaching that confidence is "reasonable" and can be 
justified in a free and democratic society. It is more difficult to argue that a limitation 
which prevents third parties from disclosing information satisfies the requirements of 
section 5. 
In considering freedom of expression issues, the identity of the person making the 
disclosure is relevant only to establish the nature and extent of that person's right to 
freedom of expression. For example, it may be relevant that the person making the 
disclosure is the media. 
(b) identity of person to whom disclosure is made 
Another circumstance that courts consider in relation to the public interest defence to 
breach of confidence is the identity of the person to whom the disclosure is made. 
12
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The origin of this appears to be in cases of disclosure of wrongdoing, where disclosure 
to the authorities is more appropriate and serves the public interest better, than 
disclosure to the media or to the public at large. n o 
Following this, some writers argue that public disclosure should be protected only 
where disclosure to the proper authorities is not practical.
131 This could be because 
the public has a right to know, because the information affects a significant proportion 
of the community. It could also be because the authorities have an interest in 
restraining the disclosure. An example of this would be where corruption in 
government is alleged. It would be pointless to suggest that government authorities 
should be notified. 
In some situations, disclosure to the authorities serves "the public interest". But which 
public interest is being served? It must be the interest in the prevention of harm and 
the efficient administration of justice. Disclosure solely to the authorities can never 
further the interest in promoting the open discussion of public affairs and the 
realisation of the democratic ideal. We have decided that this is the most important 
interest to be protected by the public interest defence. Therefore disclosure to the 
authorities should not be taken as a substitute for informing the public. 
(c) defendant's behaviour 
In considering the public interest defence to breach of confidence, courts may have 
regard to the method by which the material was obtained by the defendant.
132 This is 
important where the focus of the defence is iniquity. If the defendant has engaged in 
dishonest activities, or is seeking to exploit the material for his or her own financial 
gain, the defendant does not "come to equity with clean hands", and therefore cannot 
d d h . f . 
1'.B eman t e protection o equity. · · 
However, the focus of the proposed section 14 defence is promoting the open 
discussion of public affairs. Therefore the actions of the defendant in obtaining and 
disclosing the material are not directly relevant. It is of course not desirable to 
encourage people to break in and steal in order to obtain information. But any 
dishonest or criminal behaviour in obtaining the information can be punished 
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separately by the criminal or civil law.
134 The behaviour of the defendant should not 
be the focus of the section 14 defence. 
In breach of confidence cases, the defendant's motive can be taken into account. 
135 It 
can be relevant whether the defendant has deliberately exploited the plaintiff's 
material for economic gain, or has used the material with the genuine belief that the 
use will further the open discussion of government affairs. 
Again, this is partly connected to the principle that the defendant should not be 
allowed to take advantage of his own wrongdoing. It has already been argued that 
the defendant's wrongdoing is not relevant to a section 14 defence. 
It is submitted that if the defendant uses copyright material in a manner which 
promotes the open discussion of public affairs, the fact that the defendant makes a 
profit from the use is not directly relevant. The important factor to be considered is 
whether the use threatens the economic rationale for copyright. This factor is to be 
balanced against the public interest in freedom of expression at the third stage of the 
mqmry. 
(d) whether the information is already public 
The Copyright Act 1994 protects both published and unpublished works. It also 
protects the author's right to issue the work to the public, that is, to publish the work 
first. It follows that the information contained in a copyright work may already be 
public in the sense that it has been published. 
The significance of this lies in the fact that it will be difficult to argue that the open 
discussion of public affairs justifies an infringing use of a copyright work where the 
work is already published. If the work has not been published widely, an infringing 
use may be justified where it would serve to disseminate the information to a wider 
section of the public. Similarly, if the work is about to be published, it will be 
difficult to argue that freedom of expression requires its publication earlier. 
Therefore, arguably the most important application of a defence protecting freedom 
of expression would be where the work is unpublished and the author intends for it 
. bl" h d 116 to remam unpu 1s e . · 
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(e) the existence of reasons against publication of the work 
At this stage of the inquiry, the court would also need to consider any factors which 
would make publication or disclosure harmful to the public interest. An example is 
the existence of national security concerns. 
4 The third stage: balancing the interests 
46 
At this final stage of the inquiry, the task of the court would be to balance the 
competing interests in order to finally decide whether the defendant's use ought to be 
excused under the defence. The interest protected by freedom of expression, which 
is promoted by the defendant's use of the plaintiffs material, must be balanced against 
the public interest in maintaining copyright protection. 
The result of this balancing would depend on the individual circumstances of the 
case, as identified by the court at the second stage of the inquiry. However, it is 
possible to make some general observations about the nature of the interests to be 
balanced. 
The interests protected by freedom of expression are first, the promotion of open 
discussion of government affairs; second, the attainment of truth through the 
marketplace of ideas; and third, the value of individual self-expression. 
It is submitted that the open discussion of public affairs is the interest which provides 
the strongest case for the development of a defence to protect freedom of e:iq,ression. 
It is difficult to imagine a situation where the marketplace of ideas or the value of self-
expression could ever outweigh the public interest in the maintenance of the 
economic rationale for copyright protection. 
This is illustrated by cases of the Kennedy photos and the Ford memoirs. Earlier 
sections of this paper argued that : (1) the open discussion of public affairs requires the 
appropriation of the actual form of the plaintiffs work; 
137 and (2) the defence of fair 
dealing would not allow the use of this form in New Zealand.
138 Therefore, these 
cases are examples of situations where a public interest defence is necessary in the 
interests of the open discussion of public affairs. 
Secondly, the marketplace of ideas rationale values freedom of expression as a means 
to truth. It is in the public interest that the truth be discovered, and in some cases 
discovering the truth may be a necessary concomitant of promoting the open 
discussion of government affairs. 
137 See section VII B3. 
13R See section VIII E. 
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However, it is unlikely that the value of truth by itself could outweigh the public 
interest in maintaining copyright protection . For example, the rationale of truth 
could justify a use of material which does nothing more than correct an error in a 
previously distributed work. If uses which advance this interest only are allowed, this 
is likely to undermine the rationale for copyright protection. 
Thirdly, the private nature of the value of individual self-expression means that it is 
unlikely to outweigh the public interest in maintaining copyright protection. The 
value of self-expression will have no application to material such as the Kennedy 
photos or the extracts from the Ford memoirs. It will also have no application to 
material such as government documents. 
Therefore it is submitted that this final stage will usually involve a balancing of the 
interest in the open discussion of public affairs, with the public interest protected by 
copyright. Section 5 of the Bill of Rights should be relevant in this process. This 
would ensure that the copyright interest will prevail only in cases where that interest 
constitutes a limit which is reasonable and justified in a free and democratic society. 
C Conclusion 
It is submitted that the above proposal for a section 14 defence protects freedom of 
expression where the idea-expression dichotomy and the defence of fair dealing do 
not, namely where the appropriation of actual form is positively required by a non-
economic interest of freedom of expression. The situations of the Kennedy photos 
and the Ford memoirs can then be justified on this defence. 
XI CONCLUSION 
As we have seen, section 225(3) of the Copyright Act 1994 provides an opening for 
the development of a defence to copyright, based on the "public interest". The 
existence of the section 14 guarantee of freedom of expression in the Bill of Rights 
means that it is open to a New Zealand court to develop a "section 14 defence", a 
defence to copyright which promotes the interests of freedom of expression, especially 
the open discussion of public affairs. 
This paper has argued that such a defence should be available only where the 
defendant's use of the copyright work was necessary in order to promote the right to 
freedom of expression. The defence should succeed only where the public interest in 
freedom of expression outweighs the public interest in maintaining the economic 
incentive for copyright. 
Provided that the defence is kept within these limits, a section 14 defence to 
copyright could be a powerful tool to protect the right to freedom of expression. 
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